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Abstract: The treatment of irregular migrants in Malta is problematic from a 
human rights perspective, for it contravenes the principle of universalism that 
is intrinsic to human rights philosophy. Malta is unusual among states in that it 
imposes mandatory detention on such migrants, including asylum seekers. Based 
on a reading of foundational documents of the modern human rights movement, 
especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the article argues that the 
principle of human dignity underlies the concept of human rights, but that the 
bypassing of this principle enables the Maltese government to continue its detention 
policies while claiming to uphold human rights. It is an approach contested 
by NGOs in this area, which point to the dehumanising effects of detention on 
migrants. It is not just the appalling conditions in which migrants are held that 
renders their lives miserable, but the dehumanisation produced by detention itself.
Keywords: asylum seekers, human dignity, human rights, immigration policy, 
irregular migrants, Malta, migrant detention centres, UDHR
In an unequal and globalised world, no issue exposes more starkly the funda-
mental contradictions between different views of what constitutes the concept 
of human rights than that of the policies and practices states have produced to 
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contain and manage irregular migration. Using Malta as a case study, I argue that 
differing views of whether the concept of human dignity underlies such rights 
result in widely differing approaches to the ways in which human rights are said 
to be upheld. The displacement of human dignity from the core of human rights 
produces very different practices of human rights.
To sketch out some preliminary background, Malta, a small island state in 
the Mediterranean Sea, is the southernmost European Union member state and 
is located between Libya and Italy. Since 2002, it has seen a marked increase in 
the number of irregular immigrants, the vast majority of whom arrive by boat 
or are intercepted at sea, and would have generally left from Libya, even though 
they originate from forty-seven different countries.1 The flow of irregular 
migrants has been more or less consistent, approximately 2,000 a year, reaching 
a peak in 2008 with 2,775 migrants.2 This is a considerable number for a country 
with a population of approximately 417,000 distributed over an area of just 
316km2.3
Almost all irregular immigrants to Malta are indiscriminately detained on 
arrival for up to eighteen months in deplorable conditions – unsanitary and over-
crowded. There are three migrant detention centres on the main island: Lyster 
Barracks, Ta’ Kandja and Safi Barracks.4 At the end of December 2009, they had 
an estimated capacity of 1,900.5 If additional space is needed, migrants can also be 
detained in correctional facilities and police headquarters established by the 
authorities.6 They are run by Detention Services, which is mostly made up of per-
sonnel seconded by the Police Force or the Armed Forces of Malta.
This is made legally possible by the Immigration Act of 1970,7 which states that 
all prohibited immigrants issued with a removal order are to be placed in deten-
tion until they can be removed from Malta (Articles 5 and 14 of the Immigration 
Act).8 The Immigration Act regulates matters related to entry, visa regime and 
border control, as well as the granting of temporary and permanent residence 
permits and the granting of permission for foreigners to work. In 2002, Malta 
decriminalised the entrance without leave of its territory, but retained the deten-
tion of all migrants upon arrival.
Among the immigrants detained are also those who apply for asylum. Indeed, 
UNHCR reports that between 2002 and 2010, 84 per cent of people arriving by sea 
in Malta sought asylum.9 Malta is signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
1967 Additional Protocol, and lifted its geographical limitation in 2001 when the 
Maltese Refugee Act came into force.10 In recent years, UNHCR has consistently 
ranked Malta high on the world list of asylum applications per inhabitants. 
Between 2004 and 2008 Malta was jointly ranked with Cyprus first in the world.11
The study that follows is based on ethnographic fieldwork, including a num-
ber of in-depth interviews and participant-observer research that I carried out in 
Malta during 2008 and 2009. In preceding years, while working for numerous 
human rights institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), I 
observed increasingly how a state that had once had a reasonably good 
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reputation for upholding human rights became increasingly punitive towards 
those attempting to enter its territory. I argue here that what is fundamental to, 
and demonstrated by, this change is that the concept of human dignity has been 
displaced in government policy as the founding principle of human rights, with 
implications for the practice of such rights.
Although the situation was not optimal before,12 from 2002 onwards the cir-
cumstances of immigrants in detention centres became ever more desperate. 
Some just could not take it and escaped. Others needed psychiatric treatment and 
were admitted to hospital, only to be segregated in the Irregular Immigrants’ 
Ward at Mount Carmel Psychiatric Hospital. This former maximum security 
facility, described as the ward with the worst living conditions, had previously 
been closed down following years of public pressure, only to be reopened for 
migrants.13 Altogether life in the overcrowded rundown centres was terrible. The 
confined space with chicken wire all around drove even the strongest characters 
into disillusioned apathy after a few months. Detention became a profoundly 
dehumanising experience, which, as the following Moroccan immigrant com-
ments, leaves an indelible mark on the migrants:
Detention has never left me. I was treated like a dog, but I also became a dog, 
an animal. And when you become an animal once, you are ashamed for life.14
Detention, whose psychological damage is so powerfully described above, serves 
to exemplify the division between two main schools of thought, demonstrated by 
government, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other, which produce different 
interpretations of human rights. The ill-treatment of immigrants in detention cen-
tres is not restricted to detention per se, but is symptomatic of the way irregular 
immigrants are perceived in Malta. In addition detention centres are, not least 
due to their confined space, the locations in which dehumanising processes are 
most shockingly visible.
For NGO workers, the most powerful motivating factor is the concept of human 
dignity. Indeed, their analysis of the practices of detention is that they are only 
possible because immigrants are perceived as ‘less than human’. One NGO 
worker I interviewed revealed her indignation:
When I speak to people who are taking decisions about migrants at different 
levels, mostly my contact is about detention issues, I can’t help concluding that 
in addition to one massive stereotyping – all liars, all abusers – there’s also, 
somehow, they are perceived as less than human, and that is why, even talking 
about rights is almost – you are almost being ‘qisu wiċċek tost’ [ungrateful] that 
you are talking about rights. But if I truly believe that he’s a human being how 
can I ever imply that he shouldn’t be talking about rights, that he should be 
grateful for what he gets. If I believe that he’s as human as me, with as much 
rights as me, why would I lock him up and in those conditions?15
DeBono: ‘Less than human’ 63
Ultimately it is precisely this perception of immigrants as ‘less than human’ that 
has made migrant detention possible. The policy and conditions of detention are 
the most observable factors conditioning the lives of irregular migrants in Malta. 
Detention also has a direct influence on the asylum-seeking process, since irregu-
lar immigrants who apply for asylum go through the whole process and, if neces-
sary, the appeal, whilst living in these detention centres. The government, 
contrary to its claims, is not embracing a human rights approach by allowing a 
situation that has become dehumanising. In addition, the risk of a direct and sig-
nificant ‘spillover’ from the creation of an institution that encourages dehumanis-
ing practices shows how the policy of detention is short-sighted.
Two paradigms of human rights are thrown into relief in Malta; two schools of 
thought that differ over the concept and role of human dignity in the practice of 
human rights. The one sees human dignity as merely an inspirational concept, 
the other holds that the concept of human dignity has a normative functional 
value at the heart of such rights. The contrasting claims of the government and 
the NGOs on whether the human rights of irregular immigrants have been vio-
lated has produced a ‘human rights stalemate’. I argue that the catastrophic 
effects of detention on migrants, who are treated as, and become, ‘less than 
human’, show that the human rights paradigm the government locates itself in is 
problematic. Migrant detention is a clear example of a direct affront to human 
dignity and, as such, poses an unsurpassable barrier to the nurturing of a human 
rights culture.
The ‘human’ in human rights: the case for human dignity
Is there any need to ‘make a case for human dignity’? To the extent that human 
rights theorists expose different understandings of the function that the con-
cept of human dignity plays in the human rights movement, there is. Although 
differences might appear subtle, I argue that the issue of human dignity within 
human rights philosophy is so fundamental that it has created two very dis-
tinct movements. The implications in practice are radical and explain why situ-
ations that are not conducive to ensuring respect for the human dignity of 
immigrants do paradoxically receive support from some parts of the human 
rights system.
What is understood by human dignity in contemporary times? The philoso-
pher Oliver Sensen sums up the contemporary conception of dignity as:
Today dignity is widely conceived of as an inherent value property on the 
basis of which one can claim rights from others: one has rights because of 
one’s intrinsic and objective preciousness. In justifying human rights, the 
good (dignity) is prior to a principle stating what is right; and human rights 
as entitlements – which are justified by the good – are prior to the duties of 
the agent.16
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This definition arises out of the usage of human dignity in UN documents where 
it is clearly stated that human dignity is the justification for human rights. For 
example: ‘Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person…’17
In a nutshell, although human dignity can be described without reference to 
human rights, the prominence and significance of human dignity in contempo-
rary settings is intrinsically tied to the modern human rights movement. This 
new human rights paradigm has made human rights the easiest way to make 
claims for human dignity. What kind of different ‘understandings’ can arise from 
such a simple explanation? A debate during the negotiations on Article 1 of the 
UDHR: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights…’ serves 
to highlight the two different positions. The following is excerpted from Mary 
Ann Glendon’s book of the proceedings of the discussion, which took a total of 
six days to get through the Third Committee:
C.T. Te Water [the South African representative] produced a brief show of soli-
darity among the rest of the delegates when he moved to replace ‘dignity and 
rights’ with ‘fundamental rights and freedoms.’ … Nor, he insisted, was there 
any universal standard of dignity. Te Water’s motion ‘so electrified the meet-
ing,’ Humprey wrote, that everyone there, including Mrs Roosevelt and 
Pavlov, ‘united in protest.’ Malik reminded Te Water that the word dignity had 
been inserted in the UN Charter on the suggestion of Field Marshal Jan Smuts, 
who had led the South African delegation to the San Francisco conference. The 
next day Te Water stated that he wished to clarify his government’s position: 
The Declaration ought to be devoted to statements of fundamental rights, and 
since ‘dignity’ was not a ‘right,’ South Africa questioned the advisability of the 
reference to ‘dignity’ in Article 1.
Mrs Roosevelt, when her turn came, said that the word dignity had been con-
sidered carefully by the Human Rights Commission, which had included it in 
order to emphasize that every human being is worthy of respect. In the scheme 
of the Declaration, Article 1 did not refer to specific rights because it was meant 
to explain why human beings have rights to begin with.18
The central role of human dignity to human rights was not negotiable, in spite of 
Te Water’s and his supporters’ evident resistance. The behaviour of Mrs Roosevelt 
and Malik, who refused to enter into a discussion on the concept of human dig-
nity itself, would suggest an assumption on the part of the drafters of the non-
negotiable role of human dignity. My argument supports this assumption, on the 
basis that it is the concept of human dignity that gives a moral bearing to the 
human rights movement, making it a truly humanist movement. When human 
dignity loses its place at the core, human rights become just another set of dis-
cussed and agreed-to standards between states.
DeBono: ‘Less than human’ 65
Te Water’s proposal to limit the scope of human dignity to that of an inspira-
tional concept by leaving it only in the Preamble, would have closed the opportu-
nity to use human dignity in a ‘normative’ way. If human dignity is seen as the 
benchmark of behaviour and actions that are morally unacceptable, below which 
humanity is at risk, then human dignity can be viewed as a normative concept. It 
is not clear if the drafters had this in mind; however, the inclusion of human dig-
nity as an article in its own right makes sense when seen in this light. In fact, the 
term a ‘violation of human dignity’ has been used officially in the 1993 Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights to describe extreme situations in which human 
rights are not upheld. It was enshrined in Article 25 of the Vienna Declaration, 
which states: ‘The World Declaration on Human Rights of 1993 affirms that 
extreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a violation of human dignity’.19
Human dignity is a ‘normative’ principle of a particular type since it can only 
be endowed with meaning within a particular setting. In extreme situations the 
concept of human dignity can be a useful analytical tool to help us understand if 
and what irreducible standards have been surpassed in a given situation. Putting 
it another way, human dignity can be seen as that which allows what is unaccept-
able to emerge. It is about giving a voice to the vulnerable and victims, those who 
need it most. As Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss say:
the voices of all of those for whom the loss of dignity constitutes a real and 
immediate threat – the voices, for instance, of asylum seekers in leaky boats or 
in detention centres, persons in situations of destitution, individuals whose 
lives and communities have been uprooted by the cataclysms of nature, those 
in captivity, those on death row, women trafficked as commodities, mothers 
watching children dying of hunger, abused child soldiers, those who are the 
victims of malice or culpable ineptitude, those deemed disposable or unwor-
thy of life, those whose powerlessness leaves them prey to the strong … Dignity 
remains a vital and significant concept if for no other reason than that it directs 
our attention to just these voices, insisting that they be heard, that they be rec-
ognized and that they be responded to.20
In brief, the negotiations of the UDHR reveal a schism between two groups: those 
for whom human dignity was nothing more than an inspirational concept, and 
those who envisaged that, apart from inspirational qualities, the concept must also 
carry a functional and normative value. As a normative concept it could also be 
used to benchmark treatments that are morally unacceptable and, as will be seen 
subsequently, the application of human dignity as a benchmark to migrant deten-
tion in Malta yields a clear message that the practice is morally unacceptable.
The government vs NGOs: where are human rights?
Two clear and distinct human rights discourses have developed within the 
immigration field in Malta. On the one hand, a number of international and 
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local organisations claim a violation of human rights on various fronts and 
call for abolition of the policy of blanket detention for all migrants, in par-
ticular asylum seekers. On the other hand, the government, by positing its 
interpretation of human rights law, claims that detention does not constitute 
a violation of human rights. The latter position is reinforced by the Maltese 
law courts and to some degree by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).
The position of non-state actors: a human rights discourse
This discourse is closest to the UDHR original drafters’ ‘paradigm’ in which the 
concept of human dignity is understood as being functionally important. The 
UDHR paradigm yields a strictly person-centred approach where situations are 
scrutinised and judged according to the effects they have on individuals. 
Independent and non-governmental organisations are the main proponents of 
this discourse.
Non-state actors’ criticism of Malta’s detention policy has been forceful. The 
most common critique found in their reports focuses on the deprivation of liberty 
of nearly all irregular immigrants and the alleged arbitrariness of detention, as 
well as the fact that the positive developments that have been implemented are 
not set in law, and so can easily be changed or repealed. In just one example, a 
press release issued by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention panned 
the whole system and stated that:
The detention regime [that] immigrants in an irregular situation are subjected 
to, falls far short of international human rights law.21
Another series of complaints that have been generated by human rights organisa-
tions are those regarding the conditions of detention. The UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention expressed shock at the abysmal conditions in detention cen-
tres. The conditions of detention are:
appalling to the extent that the health, including the mental health, of the 
detainees is affected. This situation, in turn, affects their ability to properly 
understand their rights and to follow the legal proceedings related to them 
… The sub-standard closed centres of Safi and Lyster Barracks are over-
crowded. At Lyster Barracks, families are not separated from men, women, 
including pregnant and nursing mothers, and children, including unaccom-
panied minors. Although the Government applies a fast track procedure for 
the release of vulnerable groups in administrative detention, the procedures 
may take several months and be in vain for those who are considered a 
health risk. Many dwell in tents and the Working Group notes with serious 
concern that 59 inmates do not even find a place to sleep in these tents at 
present.22
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Conditions inside the migrant detention centres, despite various positive devel-
opments over the years, have long been criticised on the following grounds:
a the (almost) permanent overcrowding;
b an almost complete lack of privacy (both in sleeping/living areas and in 
showers, etc);
c no separation of female from male immigrants;
d no protection from abuse from staff or other immigrants, especially for 
female immigrants;
e unhygienic conditions;23
f difficulties accessing basic healthcare;24
g mental health considerations;25
h the denial of information about rights as potential asylum seekers.26
The same reports drawn on above also include a series of recommendations and 
proposals including minimising the length of detention to the least possible 
period; improving the conditions inside detention centres; speeding up the asy-
lum review; and empowering immigrants by giving access to legal channels. 
They also document developments in the field: legislation, infrastructure, condi-
tions within detention centres, and access to health. Notwithstanding this, the 
overall situation still falls short of required standards as has also been highlighted 
by the report, Becoming Vulnerable in Detention.27
In brief, the overall message is clear: the policy and practice of detention falls 
below acceptable standards as it is inhumane. According to these non-state actors, 
the current practice of detaining all irregular immigrants, including asylum seek-
ers, constitutes a violation of human rights. In addition, the conditions of deten-
tion in themselves need to be improved.
The other human rights discourse
This is adopted primarily by the government and law courts. It is closer to Te 
Water’s approach in that human rights are perceived from a state-centric point of 
view and it gives less centrality to the concept of human dignity. More impor-
tance is thus given to a positivistic interpretation of human rights law and state 
interests.
The government of Malta defends its practices and policies by taking a legalis-
tic stand to show that it is not violating international human rights standards. 
Bringing to the case the particular issues of the country’s size, population density 
and inability to manage or provide any long-term solutions for irregular migrants, 
the government argues that its actions are fitted to the country’s capacity and it 
therefore lives up to its international obligations. The position of the government 
is clear and has been consistent throughout the years: Malta cannot cope with the 
enormity (or potential enormity) of irregular immigration and therefore needs 
to implement a mandatory policy of detention to manage the situation. This 
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rationale underpins national laws, and so it does not come as a complete surprise 
that court judgements have not ruled against any aspects of detention. The fol-
lowing excerpt from the Prime Minister’s address to the United Nations General 
Assembly is a good example of Malta’s stance:
the small size of Malta, our financial and human resources make it extremely 
difficult to cope with such a huge number of these unfortunate people to be 
accommodated in Malta … Notwithstanding the severe difficulties faced by 
Malta, we continue to honour our international obligations vis-à-vis genuine 
refugees and persons qualifying for humanitarian protection. Malta has fea-
tured as one of the countries, in proportion to its size and population, with the 
highest number of awards to asylum-seekers … For years we have insisted on 
measures of international solidarity, beginning with effective action at EU 
level … Malta has always dealt with these situations with great responsibility, 
humanity and benevolence paying due respect to every human being without 
exception and will continue to do so. At the same time, the problem of illegal 
immigration is an international phenomenon driven by external factors which 
cannot always be prevented or even mitigated by the countries affected by 
this problem … My Government hopes that other countries would come for-
ward to assist in alleviating the burden which Malta carries – a burden so 
acutely disproportionate to Malta’s population, land size and population 
density.28
The government’s position on detention policy has been widely supported by the 
Maltese Courts. Take, for example, three cases – two of asylum seekers and one 
of a rejected asylum seeker – that invoked Article 409A of the Criminal Code.29 
This Article provides any detainee with the possibility of applying to the 
Magistrate’s Court to challenge the lawfulness of detention. If the court chooses 
to release the applicant, the Attorney General may apply for the person’s re-arrest 
if he is of the opinion that the continued arrest was founded on any provision of 
the code or other law.30 All three cases were rejected as the Court held that since 
the Immigration Act authorises detention, and imposes no limit on the amount of 
time an immigrant may spend in detention, such detention is lawful. According 
to the Court, the scope of Article 409A does not include an examination of cir-
cumstances of the lawfulness of detention, such as whether the detention itself 
violates the individual’s fundamental human rights.
Other attempts challenged the lawfulness of detention in terms of Article 34 of 
the Constitution of Malta (which is also Article 5 of the ECHR) that protects from 
arbitrary arrest or detention. In Essa Maneh et. v. Commissioner of Police, the Court 
justified detention on the basis of national security concerns as the Court high-
lighted the need to ‘avoid a flood of “irregular” people running around in Malta’.31 
In the interpretation of the law, overall, the Maltese judges and magistrates have 
reproduced, and thus further legitimised, the government’s line of argument.
DeBono: ‘Less than human’ 69
There has been one exception in the case of Barboush v. Commissioner of Police. 
Karim Barboush, an Iraqi asylum seeker, had been detained for fourteen months. 
On 25 October 2004, Magistrate Vella ruled that, although it was understand-
able that an illegal immigrant would be detained on arrival at Malta, the deten-
tion of Barboush went beyond the limits of what was considered reasonable 
and lawful. The Act stipulates that applications for refugee status are to be dealt 
with as quickly as possible and within a relatively reasonable time .32 It is worth 
reproducing a few questions Magistrate Vella posed when reading out the 
sentence:
How could one accept that a person, with fundamental human rights like any-
body else, is held in detention for 14 months when there is no disposition in the 
law that requests the arrest? How could one accept that the Board of Appeal, 
that determines refugee status, was not composed for months so that appli-
cants were left waiting in detention for nothing … The court feels that 14 
months was not a short or reasonable time in the circumstances. The court 
understands and appreciates the efforts and limited resources with which the 
authorities work and is in no way condemning anyone’s actions but the fact is 
that situations where a person is denied his freedom arbitrarily and unreason-
ably cannot be accepted.33
Are we to expect that these people, who have fundamental human rights like 
everybody else, should remain in detention until someone remembers to con-
stitute the Board of Appeal, hear the applicants’ case and decide it?34
Magistrate Vella’s person-centred approach contrasts sharply with the state-cen-
tric approach undertaken by the government and the rigid positivistic interpre-
tation of the law by the courts. His comments, rightly, make us question the 
fairness of the phenomenon of detention. Three issues are brought out in his 
argumentation: a) that the lack of resources and lack of administration do not 
constitute ‘reasonable’ and so the government is not acting within its legal right 
(Immigration Act) to detain people arbitrarily; b) the change of status of the 
immigrant to an asylum seeker needs to be taken into consideration; c) freedom 
is a fundamental human right, and a person cannot be kept in detention due to 
maladministration issues. Magistrate Vella’s ruling was revoked by the Criminal 
Court on procedural grounds and it was ordered that the case be heard again. 
This is typical of an approach in which human dignity is not the primary 
consideration.
In brief, the position adopted by the government and largely reinforced by the 
law courts is dictated by a strict interpretation of human rights law. The end 
result is radically opposed to that undertaken by non-state actors who claim, as 
seen above, that violations of human rights of irregular immigrants are ongoing. 
This also has significantly different implications for the state, which is primarily 
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responsible for safeguarding the human rights of all people within its territory. 
Non-state actors claim that the state should be held accountable. Whereas the 
government’s arguments, supported by the law courts, absolve the state from 
any responsibility of a human rights violation for a situation that it claims it is not 
equipped to handle.
On the one hand, one can say that the human rights system is ‘working’ and 
has made a difference by calling the government to account for the ill-treatment 
of irregular immigrants in Malta. On the other hand, it can be equally argued 
that, in spite of the activity spurred by the human rights system, it has not been 
effective enough because irregular immigrants in Malta have been and are still 
being subjected to a dehumanising experience. Ironically this ‘ineffectiveness’ 
is justified by an iron wall of international human rights law and its 
interpretation.
Dehumanising detention: the reality that challenges the government’s 
position
Migrant detention in Malta is officially a policy embarked on to manage the 
administrative aspects of irregular migration: from asylum applications, to 
health checks, to removals. It is an indirect result of the enactment of several 
EU laws and regulations that are part of the EU acquis. These laws have served 
to bring Malta’s legal framework in line with international human rights stan-
dards, intended, in theory, to provide greater protection to asylum seekers. In 
practice, the phenomenon of detention in Malta is a complex institutional set-
up designed to facilitate the removal of people without a permit to stay and 
accommodate those immigrants whose removal order is suspended, pending 
a decision on their asylum applications. Immigrants emerge from this experi-
ence claiming that they feel ‘less than human’. Detaining people for a short 
and reasonable period of time in decent conditions for administrative reasons 
might be considered justifiable. The dehumanising practices that arise as a 
consequence of detention are, however, much more difficult to justify as 
acceptable.
What is the effect of detention on immigrants? During my fieldwork, I wanted 
to understand how immigrants articulated their experience of detention. In a way 
I also wanted some reassurance that I was not projecting my own horror and 
shock at the ongoing practices and policy of detention. I asked an Eritrean immi-
grant during one of our conversations what he felt was the worst thing about 
detention. Having just spent months reviewing human rights reports on migrant 
detention in Malta, part of me was expecting: the overcrowding, the food – which 
everyone complains about – or the stinky toilets getting blocked every other day, 
or the unhygienic showers. Following a pregnant moment of silence, which I now 
recognise as typical, however long after their release from detention you ask 
immigrants about their experience, he replied:
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It isn’t easy to be in a situation that kills the internal soul.35
This is what I set out to understand in an attempt to make sense of the two con-
tradictory discourses of human rights. Using the concept of human dignity as a 
lens, I asked: in what way is detention in Malta a situation that ‘kills the internal 
soul’? A Congolese immigrant, who spent over eighteen months in detention and 
whose asylum application failed, shed more light on this. He described his expe-
rience of detention in Malta, making the characteristic analogy with animals, as 
‘dehumanising’. He said:
Detention dehumanizes the human being. The detainee is reduced to the 
state of an animal. One wakes up, eats, sleeps, wakes up … as in a stable. 
What is the difference between cows in a stable and an inmate at Safi Barracks? 
The cow sleeps, the inmate sleeps, the cow is fed, the inmate is fed, the cow 
goes out for a few minutes under the supervision of its master, the detainee 
also goes out into the courtyard for a few minutes, under the surveillance of 
the soldiers.36
The sense of emptiness and loss of meaning show part of the pain of going 
through a dehumanising experience. The gravity of the experience is expressed 
by the continual invocation of God. An often heard phrase among West Africans 
is: ‘it is only by the Grace of God that we can get over/forget detention’.37 The 
same Congolese migrant expressed his wish that the Maltese understand that 
migrants’ suffering starts before detention and it is compassion that they seek on 
their arrival in Malta. It is interesting to note that the Congolese migrant chose to 
present detention as an issue of justice. Justice here is used in the broader sense of 
‘fairness’, but it also alludes to a common perception by immigrants that deten-
tion is a ‘punishment’. He says:
The victims of this detention have no other consolation except for their tears. 
All these people who were abused, bullied and maltreated, and all those who 
continue to be abused, bullied and maltreated because they fled their respec-
tive countries are the forgotten members of our society. They escaped from the 
frying pan into the fire. To experience the bullying misery of detention, one 
must have been there and lived through it. It’s like I said one day to the judge 
who was in charge of the enquiry regarding the suppression of the demonstra-
tions carried out by detainees in Safi Barracks: ‘Coming to Malta, we commit-
ted the same stupid mistake as the crocodile who was walking in the bush one 
day, when he suddenly saw that it was going to rain, so he rushed into the 
river to escape the rain. We were trying to escape abuse and violations of 
human rights, but in Malta we found out that these were not milder here than 
in our countries! And the big question will always remain unanswered: Should 
we really have fled?’38
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This explains why the effect on the detainees is not simply one of frustration at 
the bad conditions, or lack of liberty, but a delivery of subjugation and humilia-
tion that together converge into a dehumanising experience. The following is a 
quote from my own field notes which helps to shed light on how I came to this 
conclusion:
I learnt more about the effects of detention on two separate occasions when I 
met with the managers of the Ħal Far Open Centre and the Marsa Open 
Centre. Both gave me a tour of the centres they were responsible for. I noticed 
that as they were taking me around both took on a ‘monitoring’ role; and 
their gaze would linger on any activity between migrants in the centre, no 
doubt registering who was befriending whom, and so on. In almost identical 
automatic gestures, both continuously drew my attention and commented 
non-stop on new residents. These migrants, just released from detention, 
walked with their heads bent, huddled in groups and when not looking fur-
tively over their shoulders they had a sheepish, almost empty, fixed gaze. To 
show me how ‘slow’ the new immigrants were, one of the managers in a jok-
ing, almost jeering move, shouted at the top of his voice ‘Good morning!’ to 
a group of three new Nigerian migrants. The reaction was immediate, their 
bodies tensed, they looked back almost defiantly but expressionless, and 
walked away. The other manager, in a similar gesture, moved quickly 
towards a group where he had spotted new residents. He extended his hand 
with a smile and a good morning. The reaction again was telling: the Eritrean 
immigrant took a quick step back, bending his head, awkwardly staring at 
the manager’s extended hand. Not before stealing a quick look up to check if 
the gesture was friendly did he slowly extend his hand back. As we left the 
group, the manager under his breath told me, in a concerned tone: ‘It will 
take time … “freedom” doesn’t automatically come with release from deten-
tion … freedom comes when they manage to work detention out of their 
system.’39
The effects of detention on immigrants are also the subject of the Europe-wide 
report Becoming Vulnerable in Detention. The country report on Malta concludes 
that there are a number of factors, related to or resulting from, their detention in 
Malta, that lie at the root of a marked deterioration in immigrants’ physical and 
mental health/well-being. These are: complaints from detainees of increased 
stress, frustration, loss of appetite, sleeping problems and feelings of powerless-
ness. Significantly the causes identified, which are often aggravated by past trau-
mas experienced in their country of origin or on the journey to Malta, are various: 
the fact that they are deprived of their liberty, the lack of information about their 
situation, their inability to do anything about it, the poor conditions in detention, 
being incommunicado with family and friends and the lack of possibilities for 
engaging in gainful activities.40
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One of the more apparent manifestations of inhuman treatment is represented 
by cases of physical violence. Taunting and bullying by a few soldiers was com-
monplace yet rarely punished. The most public example, denounced by many, 
was an incident in which immigrants were beaten up during a peaceful demon-
stration at Safi Barracks on 13 January 2005.41 Immigrants housed in B Block held 
a demonstration to protest the conditions in their detention centre, the length of 
their detention and the lack of information about the progress of their applica-
tions for refugee status and humanitarian protection. One hour after the start of 
the demonstration a large number of soldiers in law-enforcement gear took up 
position around the demonstrators. When the demonstrators refused to return 
quietly to their barracks, the soldiers charged at them and violently put down the 
demonstration. Some of the soldiers were reported as having uttered racist slurs 
in encouraging their colleagues to beat the detainees.42
In the mayhem that ensued, twenty-six foreigners and two soldiers were 
injured and had to be taken to hospital for examination and treatment. The inci-
dents took place in full view of the soldiers’ superiors and of the media, which 
reported the incidents extensively. Eleven months later, the Maltese government 
published the report of the magisterial inquiry, which concluded that the use of 
force so that the immigrants would return indoors was justified but that the force 
applied by several soldiers ‘was exaggerated and out of proportion in the circum-
stances’. The Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner called on the 
Maltese authorities to take administrative measures as speedily as possible, pros-
ecute those already identified as responsible for the use of excessive violence and 
conduct a thorough investigation with a view to prosecuting any additional cul-
prits not yet identified. In addition, training and supervision of members of the 
AFM in dealing with the detention of foreigners had to be provided by the 
authorities.43
Violence on immigrants by other immigrants, at times the result of mental 
health problems but also due to the lack of security in the centres, has been a 
regular occurrence. In one incident during my fieldwork, following a dispute, an 
immigrant poured hot water from the water boiler on to another immigrant while 
he was asleep on his mattress on the ground at night. The aggressor was given a 
warning and moved to another centre. A few years back, an Egyptian immigrant 
was brutally murdered by another immigrant. This time the murder happened in 
the afternoon while the victim was sleeping in the room he shared with another 
fifteen detainees. The aggressor used iron bedposts to smash his head. The site of 
the crime was splattered with large quantities of blood that could not be cleaned 
until evidence had been collected. This was an additional trauma for the other 
detainees as it meant that the dried blood remained there for around a week.
Such dehumanisation greatly affects NGO workers and soldiers too. In a way, 
it is detention’s ‘collateral damage’. For the few NGO workers who have a permit 
to enter detention centres, witnessing the deterioration of immigrants in deten-
tion and the feelings of helplessness are often exhausting experiences. The lack of 
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Figure 1. Armed Forces of Malta beat migrant detainees during protest at Kirkop football ground, 
13 January 2005 (Photo: Taken by Alfred Giglio, courtesy of The Times of Malta)
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understanding among other Maltese adds to their frustration. Detention is hardly 
visible, partly because of a policy of refusing media representatives access to 
detention centres. This policy was very slightly relaxed from 2008, but, amidst all 
these frustrations, an NGO worker complained that this was still not enough. She 
went on to describe her experience of detention:
I think that somehow it’s one thing to read a write-up in a newspaper and see 
some photos, you know. Somehow it’s so different to actually go inside: to sit 
there and smell that horrible fetid air, slight smell of drains, to be in that crowded 
environment, with beds all on each other and all those people all vying for atten-
tion, all – ‘please, please help me’, ‘you must listen to my story’, ‘mine is the 
worst’ … All individuals literally … That is something you can’t really get through 
media coverage. I think that the full horror of detention is difficult to portray, but 
I do think that if there was more openness and we had journalists who were will-
ing to go inside and speak to people, it could make some difference.44
The immigrants are not alone in viewing detention as a punishment. Although 
the criminalisation of illegal entry was expunged from Maltese laws in 2002, it 
was clear to me that, in spite of rhetoric and official documents stating otherwise, 
this was still the dominant mentality among policy-makers.45 During my field-
work, I once found myself in the midst of a group conversation with various 
ministry (including other associated agencies) officials in a canteen. This came at 
a time when I had had a series of conversations with them about the administra-
tive necessity of detention centres. Detention was always presented in business-
like and managerial terms – establishing identity, health checks, processing 
asylum claims – all for the good of Maltese society and immigrants themselves. 
The following conversation showed me that the processes entailed in the phe-
nomenon of detention were not as apolitical as they appeared on the surface.
Out of the blue, one of the guys asked: what was my ‘problem’ with detention? 
Heads turned to listen to my reply, making it clear that this was something that 
they had been discussing before, in relation to me. I decided to be tactical and 
avoid being controversial, without being dishonest, since I suspected that they 
were less interested in my reply, but had something to tell me. So I made refer-
ence to an incident which involved violence against immigrants in the com-
munity and said that my concern lies with the effects that detention might have 
on immigrants’ integration and Maltese attitudes towards immigrants. They 
were quick to respond. The problem is that these people will find gullible souls 
(I am not sure if this was a direct reference to me) or vulnerable people like 
prostitutes and older unmarried women amongst the Maltese and start mak-
ing their way ‘in’. They went on to explain to me that once the Maltese start 
‘mixing’ with immigrants, that’s when the big problems will begin – detention 
ensures that this situation is kept under control. That is what we have to avoid 
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at all costs. Detention is needed, because the immigrants need to know that ‘we 
mean business’. That law and order is valued in Malta and those who break the 
rules get punished.46
This is completely different to what I had been told before. It strongly suggests 
that the practice of subjugation and humiliation is not unintentional but is the 
manifestation of evil and deeply entrenched beliefs. The root cause of the admin-
istrative mayhem and the irrational policies surrounding detention is the type of 
structural violence found in underlying social forces like racism and social 
inequality. The most serious is that of considering people ‘less than human’, as 
being fundamentally unequal, which manifests itself as a lack of respect for 
human dignity. In brief, looking at detention through the lens of human dignity 
shows us that basic irreducible standards have been bypassed. The lack of free-
dom and ‘appalling’ conditions reported by human rights organisations have 
made possible the creation of a space where dehumanising practices are com-
monplace and immigrants are reduced to mere existence, ‘less than human’.
In further support of the notion that deep underlying social forces are manifest 
in detention practices is the shame of people working within the system when 
they realise that they have stopped resisting the system. Nurturing a perception 
that immigrants are really ‘less than human’ may be what allows the system to 
continue operating. But this same perception may be rather difficult to keep in 
place for those people, like NGO workers and some detention officers, who are in 
direct contact with the immigrants:
You have all the ugliness of humankind that could possibly happen, is happen-
ing there. And somewhere along the line we came to accept it. I think it really 
hit me towards the end of last year, 2008, when I actually said to my staff, some-
where along the line we’ve stopped trying to fight this, we’ve accepted it.47
This is the kind of situation that human rights set out to change and eradicate 
from society. A situation in which ‘the ugliness of humankind’ is present ought 
to be the kind of situation in which the human rights machinery sets to work!
Human dignity points to two major shortcomings that have led to the human 
rights failure to protect irregular migrants in Malta. The first is that government 
policy on detention does not place human dignity at the centre of its efforts. This 
is because the government embraces a flawed understanding of human rights 
that is over-legalised and positivistic, and therefore fails to identify, let alone 
address, its root causes. Human rights considerations ought to start from the situ-
ation on the ground – how are people being treated? What does this experience 
mean for them? Instead, the government has chosen the legalistic route that con-
sists, essentially, of an impersonal choice and a top-down approach. Reminiscent 
of the thinking of Te Water, this not only lacks depth but in practice derails human 
rights from what it sets out to achieve. It is understandable that the government 
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seeks to manage irregular migration in a way that fits with the national scenario 
and seeks long-term solutions to irregular migration. This should not, however, be 
done at the expense of the human rights of irregular migrants themselves.
Towards a human rights culture
Human rights discourses that fail to retain human dignity at their core are intrin-
sically flawed. Detention in Malta is an example of an incongruous situation 
whereby human rights, conceived on the basis of the ‘inherent dignity’ of every 
human being, in practice indirectly support a situation that has dehumanising 
effects. The production and reproduction of ‘human rights’ by the different dis-
courses has fashioned the dominant interpretation put forward by the govern-
ment, which establishes that no human rights are being violated even if the 
treatment of immigrants in detention is unacceptable. This is the result of deeply 
embedded social forces that the human rights movement has a mandate to 
change. Looking at detention from the vantage point of human dignity gives us 
the boldness to denounce the practice as morally wrong, and to assert that any 
interpretation of human rights that supports it (or does not consider it a violation 
of human rights) is flawed.
It is within the framework that Malta cannot always offer opportunities and 
life choices for migrants that the government must sustain its efforts at building 
international solidarity and finding long-term solutions. The first step towards 
achieving change in the treatment of irregular immigrants in Malta is a review of 
the whole system of detention. In parallel to this, immigrants should be empow-
ered to speak out – through legal channels, media and so on – and be in a position 
to challenge their situation in an independent court, thus ensuring the implemen-
tation of the rule of law.
Detention needs to be kept to the barest minimum, since in practice it is diffi-
cult to envisage an institution that intrinsically deprives people of their liberty as 
humane. In addition, as already demonstrated, detention creates a space where 
there is a huge risk of manifestations as well as constructions of systemic or struc-
tural violence.
The importance of human rights organisations – national human rights institu-
tions, local and international NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and treaty-
based monitoring bodies – cannot be emphasised enough. For their approach 
demonstrates the theoretical necessity of retaining the concept of human dignity 
at the core of their activities; activities that then feed debates and discussions in 
the public sphere with informed material from a human rights perspective. In 
addition, human rights organisations have played a crucial role in highlighting 
the plight of irregular immigrants. Without their contribution and the media 
interest they generated, one could cautiously conclude that the conditions of 
irregular immigrants in Malta would have been much worse.
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Human rights education is key to addressing the root causes of undignified 
treatment and in particular the perception of immigrants as ‘less than human’. 
The changes that human rights organisations propose are important but the social 
forces producing structural violence will still be there. One could have the most 
modern and well-equipped detention centres, but if immigrants are perceived as 
‘less than human’ then that will be reflected in everyday practices. As the Eritrean 
immigrant quoted earlier drove home so powerfully, the death of the ‘internal 
soul’, the desperation, the ‘horror’ of detention are not brought about by the over-
crowding, the cold food, or the lack of access to lawyers, but by the ‘less than 
human’ status afforded him.
The lack of understanding of the role of human dignity and its role in ground-
ing human rights philosophy, is possibly the biggest indication that states’ param-
eters for what constitutes human rights are on the wrong track, and that, as the 
human rights thinker Costas Douzinas commented, contemporary societies may 
be heading towards the ‘end of human rights’. Similarly, but with less pessimism, 
Jurgen Habermas has aptly likened the concept of human dignity to a seismo-
graph.48 Just as a seismograph records tremors and seismic waves, and acts as a 
warning of an imminent earthquake, so the concept of human dignity serves to 
warn us whether laws, policies or actions prioritise and respect human beings. 
The phenomenon of migrant detention in Malta is one such example, to be taken 
as a warning of a great malaise. Such detention policies, and the practices they 
generate, are founded on and foster the perception that, somehow, the process 
of migration renders people ‘less than human’.
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